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NEITHER THEOCRACY NOR CIVIL RELIGION 
CAN SERVE THE COMMON GOOD 
 
 
Introduction 
‘Do not fear those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul; rather fear him 
who can destroy both soul and body in hell (Gehenna).’ (Mt 10.28) This saying of 
Jesus was for centuries a cause of great anxiety for those who held power and for their 
advisors, if they happened to believe that the essence of their power lay in their ability 
to punish, including the taking of life. Many such people will have taken to heart 
Machiavelli’s advice to a prince that it is better to be feared than to be loved.1 He 
reasoned that fear was reliable as a motive while love or gratitude could so easily be 
silenced or drowned out by pressing concerns. Jesus’ words are placed in the context 
of his foretelling of the persecutions that will be suffered by his disciples, who will be 
delivered up to councils and governors and kings (Mt 10.16-23). ‘Have no fear of 
them’ (Mt 10.26) is the advice which Jesus gives. 
 
In the modern period Thomas Hobbes was the preeminent theorist of fear as 
the key to power. In the absence of a shared view of the good and a common 
commitment to realising it, the only way in which diverse individuals each motivated 
to pursue their own interests could be made conform to a common rule, he thought, 
was to bind them with fear, fear of the sovereign’s power to punish, and fear of the 
consequences of the absence of such power. And because he was so aware of the 
motivating force of fear, he was particularly concerned about the impact of religious 
belief on the stability and security of a commonwealth. A populace more in fear of 
divine retribution than of the magistrate’s sword could not be relied upon to obey. In 
discussing religion Hobbes defined it in terms of fear: fear of powers unseen. And 
such fear was in direct competition with fear of visible powers, fear of the sovereign 
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and its agents.2 Consequently Hobbes laid down very strict conditions for the 
licensing of preachers and clergy within the commonwealth, so as to ensure that the 
effect of their ministry would be to support rather than jeopardize the power of the 
sovereign. And because the Catholic Church taught that sovereigns were not above 
divine law and divine retribution, he concluded that it could not be tolerated within 
the state. Catholic priests fostered in their congregations a fear of divine power and 
likely punishment, and such doctrine could only detract from the status of the 
sovereign as one worthy of fearful respect. The fourth part of Leviathan, ‘The 
Kingdom of Darkness’, addresses this problem the Catholic Church poses for the 
security of the state from Hobbes’s perspective and argues for total intolerance. 
 
Religion is not seen only as threat however. It can deliver important benefits 
for the political association and Hobbes recognizes religion as a powerful motivator 
and unifier of masses of people. And so in the third part of Leviathan Hobbes 
recommends how these positive benefits might be secured by the incorporation of 
religion in the life of what he calls a Christian commonwealth. 
 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the Social Contract also sees the potential positive 
social contribution of religion. In order to harness and exploit those advantages 
specifically for the benefit of the republic he speculates on the kind of religion which 
could deliver the required outcomes. He advocates the fostering of civil religion in the 
republic for the benefits which such religion might ensure for the peace and stability 
of the community. But Rousseau recognized a dilemma: the kind of religion which 
would serve as a civil religion would simply be an ersatz religion, not the genuine 
article; but an ersatz religion would be incapable of generating the kind of motivation 
and commitment required. 
 
Political philosophers in the modern period are ambivalent towards religion. 
On the one hand they see it as a source of threat and a competitor for citizens’ 
allegiance. On the other hand they recognize that it provides many social benefits 
                                                 
2 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), Part I, chap. 6, where he 
introduces his basic definitions: ‘Fear of power invisible, feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales 
publicly allowed, RELIGION; not allowed, SUPERSTITION. And when the power imagined, is truly 
such as we imagine, TRUE RELIGION.’ See also, chap. 12, ‘On Religion’. 
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especially the fostering of community among the citizens, who are more likely to be 
moved by religious than by political or republican exhortation. 
 
In considering the relationship between Religion and Politics one is inclined to 
shift to the more concrete and particular concept pair ‘Church and State’. Obviously 
the two concept pairs are closely intertwined, especially as the notion of politics in the 
modern period is closely allied with that very particular form of rule which we call the 
modern state, despite the great variety of forms it can take. To speak of politics in the 
modern context then brings with it certain assumptions about the form of state to 
which that kind of politics corresponds. Is there a similar shift from religion to church 
as typical institutional form for the representation of religion in public life? I do not 
think the association is as strong as in the case of politics and state, partly because of 
the success of the modern liberal movement in redefining religion as a private matter, 
an exercise of private choice.  
 
I want to concentrate here on the more general terms, religion and politics, 
while bearing in mind the common assumption that politics has to do with the 
government of modern states. In this I rely on a very significant recent study of civil 
religion from the perspective of liberalism. Ronald Beiner in his Civil Religion. A 
Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy has explored the manner in which 
religion has been a recurrent topic of interest for liberals. In his conclusion he maps 
out the typical positions which can be held on the relationship between politics and 
religion.  
‘(1) the idea that politics and religion should be kept separate 
(liberalism); 
(2) the idea that politics and religion should be joined together but 
governed by the supremacy of religion (theocracy); 
(3) the idea that politics and religion should be joined together but 
governed by the supremacy of politics (civil religion).’3 
These three ideas are documented in the history of political philosophy, but Beiner, 
who acknowledges that he ‘has very little interest in religion as such’, points out that 
his research reveals a latent alliance between the first and the third. In other words, the 
                                                 
3 Ronald Beiner, Civil Religion. A Dialogue in the History of Political Philosophy. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 412. 
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liberalism which desires to keep religion and politics separate can often be allied 
tacitly or implicitly with the stance which wishes to maintain the supremacy of 
politics.4 
 
Beiner’s great achievement is to provide a fresh critical reading of Rousseau 
on civil religion, revealing that the standard account is a misrepresentation. Far from 
concluding that politics can successfully instrumentalize religion for its purposes, as is 
usually thought to be his view, Rousseau came to the conclusion that the kind of 
religion which might be made useful for politics would not succeed because it would 
be severely deficient, precisely as religion. Beiner points to Rousseau’s survey of the 
various forms of religion linked to politics in Book IV chapter 8 of The Social 
Contract, and remarks how he rejected all the surveyed forms of national religion. 
Rousseau then ends up with a form of toleration similar to that of Locke, but for 
Beiner this suggests Rousseau’s own dissatisfaction with the form of civic-republican 
utopia which he has been developing. Beiner comments: ‘Rousseau’s thought 
fluctuates between two opposed and contradictory standpoints, the standpoint of 
cosmopolitan brotherhood and the standpoint of national particularism, and the idea of 
civil religion seems to get caught in the interstices of this tension.’5 Beiner 
summarizes the argument as he finds it in Rousseau: 
‘Theocracy “works” as a civil religion but violates political right, 
whereas Christianity satisfies principles of moral legitimacy but does 
not “work” as a basis for politics. Good politics presupposes a false 
and inhuman religion; a true religion breeds bad politics. Hence each 
serves merely to cancel the practical validity of the other. If the 
problem of civil religion presents as much of an aporia as our reading 
has suggested, then one is required to reread the whole of the Social 
Contract in the light of this impasse with which the book concludes. 
True politics is particularistic and true religion is universalistic, and so 
“civil religion” does not name a genuine synthesis of religion and 
politics but rather identifies their necessary contradiction.’6  
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5 Beiner, Civil Religion p. 82. 
6 Beiner, Civil Religion p. 83. 
 5 
I wish to accept the summary arguments presented here which point on the one 
hand to the unsatisfactory nature of theocracy, and on the other hand to the 
impossibility of a civil religion. The case which remains to be made is to argue for the 
separation of politics and religion (the first idea), but in such a way that religion is not 
tacitly instrumentalized for the good of the state. There is a general presupposition, 
not always articulated, that when politics is considered from a religious standpoint the 
preferred stance is that of theocracy, and any other accommodation between religion 
and politics is in effect a compromise, with the religious side giving up its desire to 
dominate politics. An adequate defence of the separation of religion and politics will 
require an appreciation of the kind of religion which would have genuinely religious 
and not merely pragmatic grounds for the separation. At the same time, the 
understanding of the political would have to be properly secular, and free of hidden 
strains of anti-clericalism, genuinely allowing for the coexistence of the religious. 
 
Politics and Religion to be Kept Separate (Liberalism) 
The position identified by Beiner as liberalism, as neither theocracy nor civil 
religion, would seem from a political perspective to be the most promising. Also from 
a theological perspective, this stance of separation allows the possibility of preserving 
the freedom of religion. In what follows, I wish to explore two sets of reasons in 
defence or advocacy for this position. First of all, I will consider the political 
philosophical arguments for separation, and then, second, I will review some 
theological arguments in support of separation. 
 
Philosophical Defence 
Several major publications present liberalism as a philosophy of politics which 
insists on both the separation of religion from politics and at the same time the 
neutrality of politics towards religion, respecting the freedom of religion, and 
allowing space for religion to exist free from political interference. John Rawls’s 
Political Liberalism is a major contribution in this regard, providing one way of 
conceiving of the relationship between the religious and the political in terms of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and a political conception of justice as the 
content of an overlapping consensus.7 This very fruitful proposal has not met with 
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everyone’s agreement, and noteworthy points of criticism have explored the extent to 
which Rawls’s approach imports a disregard for the distinctiveness of religion.8 But 
for my purposes, Rawls serves as an example of one attempt, subsequently improved 
in this regard, to provide an account of politics which embraces the idea of separation 
along with respect for the freedom of religion. Rawls’s work has the added advantage 
of clearly identifying a form of secularism which is principally opposed to religion in 
public life as an instance of a comprehensive doctrine, and so not appropriate as the 
philosophical toolbox for the overlapping consensus of political and public reason. 
Rawls is aware that there are these alternative forms of secular liberalism, but he is 
also aware of the importance of preserving the neutrality of the political, and so 
guards against the domination of the political by the secular. 
 
Another recent publication from Charles Taylor and Jocelyn Maclure builds on 
Rawls’s work but also focuses on the contrast between the two kinds of secularism.9 
They follow Rawls in disavowing as appropriate for the political realm the kind of 
secularism which is fundamentally anti-religious, at most being prepared to tolerate it 
as a private matter. They maintain that  
‘…the state should adopt a position of neutrality not only towards 
religions but also toward the different philosophical conceptions that 
stand as the secular equivalents of religions. In fact, a political system 
that replaces religion with a comprehensive secular philosophy as the 
foundation of its actions makes all the faithful members of a religion 
into second-class citizens, since these citizens do not embrace the 
reasons and evaluations enshrined in the officially recognized 
philosophy.’10  
Taylor and Maclure elaborate their understanding of secularism as based ‘on two 
major principles, namely, equality of respect and freedom of conscience, and on two 
operative modes that make the realization of these principles possible, to wit, the 
                                                 
8 E.g. Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘The Role of Religion in Decision and Discussion of Political Issues’, in 
Religion in the Public Square. By R. Audi and N. Wolterstorff, (London, New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1997), pp. 67-120; Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rawls and Religion. The Case for 
Political Liberalism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001); Paul J. Weithman, Religion 
and the Obligations of Citizenship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Christopher J. 
Eberle, Religious Conviction in Liberal Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
9 Jocelyn Maclure, and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2011) 
10 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism p. 13. 
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separation of church and state and the neutrality of the state towards religions.’11 
More restrictive forms of secularism aimed at marginalizing religion adopt an 
atheistic or agnostic view of the world, and so abandon any pretence to neutrality. 
Taylor and Maclure distinguish therefore between two conceptions of secularism, the 
liberal-pluralist view, and the republican view. These are distinguished by whether the 
requirement of neutrality is imposed on institutions only, or whether they are also 
directed at individuals. The liberal-pluralist view of secularism is directed only at 
institutions and not at individuals. By contrast, on the republican view, not only 
institutions, but also individuals are obliged ‘to exercise self-restraint and display 
neutrality, by abstaining from displaying their faith when they frequent public 
institutions, or in the most radical view, when they enter the public sphere.’12 The 
choice of the term ‘republican’ to label the more restrictive form is evidently 
influenced by the French and Quebecois experience. They note in addition how this 
so-called republican view seems to assume a watertight barrier between individuals’ 
private and public lives. 
 
The liberal-pluralist view of secularism as a political philosophy arises more 
directly from the North American experience, although that experience has also 
revealed a long history of uncovering and resisting institutionalized prejudice against 
some religions. Martha Nussbaum has provided a valuable study of the emergence of 
the value of religious equality in the American experience.13 It is noteworthy how the 
subtitle of her book stresses religious equality, and not alone religious liberty. She 
acknowledges how a distinctively Protestant understanding of religion predominated 
at certain stages in the history of the United States with the result that other religious 
traditions were excluded from the protection of the law and suffered discrimination. 
Nevertheless, the value of religious liberty was articulated as worthy of legal 
protection from the beginning of the Republic, and that against the background of 
religious persecution, not only in the mother countries of the first immigrants, but also 
most decisively in the first colonies.  
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13 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience. In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality 
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Nussbaum explores the double source for the valuing of religious liberty in the 
Stoic philosophy familiar to the founding generation in America and the Protestant 
emphasis on conscience. Roger Williams, the founder of the colony of Rhode Island, 
and the author of its charter, is taken by Nussbaum as the preeminent spokesman for 
religious liberty rooted in respect for the dignity of conscience. Rhode Island’s charter 
in its various editions, renewed by the English king Charles II following the 
Restoration, ensured religious liberty in a manner which was recognized at the time as 
a radical innovation. According to Williams’s correspondence, the king realised he 
was experimenting with the radical idea that a civil government could be compatible 
with the freedom of conscience.14 The prevalent assumption at the time was that a 
political community required a shared religion so as to ensure the degree of unity 
required for harmonious existence. So strong was this assumption that persecution to 
enforce uniformity was accepted in the first colonies of New England. 
 
Roger Williams had fled persecution in Massachusetts and attempted in Rhode 
Island the construction of a form of public and common life which would not rely on 
persecution of dissidents. In his voluminous writings against persecution and in 
favour of religious liberty he debated with John Cotton of Massachusetts, who had 
written in defence of the need to enforce orthodoxy. In surveying this debate 
Nussbaum highlights two of Cotton’s contentions which Williams had to counter. The 
first was the widely held view that people could not live at peace with one another 
unless they shared fundamental religious beliefs. This was the operative assumption in 
the resolutions of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) summarized in the slogan, cuius 
regio, eius religio, the religion of a country shall be that of its king. Cotton’s second 
argument was concerned with the required virtues of public officials. In Nussbaum’s 
summary formulation, ‘we simply do not want our public life to be run by sinners, 
because they are making very important decisions, and if they are sinners they will do 
so sinfully and badly’.15 For these two reasons, to ensure public peace, and to 
guarantee the moral goodness of public officers, Cotton was prepared to persecute 
those who by adherence to dissident views jeopardized the harmony of the 
community. John Cotton vigorously advocated religious persecution in various 
                                                 
14 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience p. 48. 
15 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience p. 63. 
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writings as necessary for public order, and to cut away the diseased part of the 
community which was likely to infect the healthy remainder.16 
 
In several books published in England in 1644, and 1653, Roger Williams 
attacked this willingness to persecute as a ‘bloody tenet’, and established a different 
practice in his colony, based on respect for conscience. Nussbaum records that 
‘[d]uring a period in which there were fifty prosecutions for witchcraft in 
Massachusetts and forty-three in Connecticut (where orthodoxy was even more 
severe), there were no such trials in Rhode Island, the colony that Williams 
founded.’17 
 
Williams countered Cotton’s persecuting zeal with a defence in favour of 
conscience, but also with an argument that persecution itself is more likely to disturb 
the civil peace than the coexistence of differing religious sects. On the required 
goodness of public officials Williams distinguished different forms of goodness, and 
he denied that the moral probity and civil integrity of officials required of them a 
religious virtue. This echoes a distinction drawn by St Thomas Aquinas when 
addressing a similar question, whether the law can make people good. Aquinas 
remarks that the good is predicated in different senses, either simply, or qualified in 
some way.18 A qualified sense of goodness is the goodness of compliance with the 
law, and a more complete goodness is realised when a virtuous character acts 
spontaneously in accordance with the law from a direct willing of the comprehended 
good. So Aquinas following Aristotle can confirm that the law’s purpose is to make 
people good, and he qualifies Aristotle by noting that the attainable goodness is the 
minimal sense of compliance with the law.19 If they conform their behaviour to what 
the law commands, avoiding those actions which are prohibited, and performing 
whatever actions are required, people are in this sense good. And in a sense, this 
meaning of goodness is the only one which human law with its instruments can 
attempt to achieve. The coercive force of law can succeed in effecting compliance, but 
                                                 
16 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience pp. 38-9. 
17 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience p. 40. 
18 St Thomas Aquinas, in Summa Theologiae I-II q.92 a.1. 
19 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II q.92 a.1 ad3m: ‘The common good of the political community cannot 
flourish unless the citizens be virtuous, at least those whose business it is to govern. But it is enough for the 
good of the community that the other citizens be so far virtuous that they obey the commands of their 
rulers.’ 
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has no proper instrument for ensuring that the compliance springs spontaneously from 
virtuous character. The lawmaker can hope that habituation through the discipline of 
laws can lead to the formation of character, but she cannot make it happen.20 Implicit 
in Aquinas’s remarks that at least the lawmakers must be virtuous is the thought that 
no society which relied solely on fear through the enforcement of law ensuring 
compliance could survive. The complete police-state, regulating and monitoring 
everything, is doomed. So there is a genuine question about virtue, and about 
character, which arises for any polity which is aware of its limitations in making law. 
 
 Nussbaum sees in Williams’ sophisticated approach to the goodness required 
of officials an anticipation of Rawls’s idea of an ‘overlapping consensus’. In addition 
she maintains that the kind of respect for conscience which he advocates is not based 
on scepticism about the capacity of human reason to attain the truth. Williams did not 
evade the dilemma posed for those who were convinced of the truth of their own 
convictions, and the error of others’ views: how are their views to be respected, when 
they are believed to be false? Nussbaum quotes Williams in saying: ‘I commend that 
Man whether Jew or Turke, or Papist, or who ever that steeres no otherwise than his 
Conscience dares’ and comments that what Williams emphasizes in this context is not 
so much the ability to find the truth, but the sincere quest for it.21  
‘The idea that we are all solitary travellers, searching for light in a dark 
wilderness, led to the thought that this search, this striving of 
conscience, is what is more precious about the journey of human life – 
and that each person – Protestant, Catholic, Jew, Muslim, or pagan – 
must be permitted to conduct it in his or her own way, without 
interference either from the state or from orthodox religion.’22  
It is noticeable how intellectualist is Nussbaum’s interpretation of religious 
conviction. Toleration is not based on scepticism. 
 
                                                 
20 Considering the need for human law, Aquinas writes: ‘since some are found to be depraved and prone to 
vice and not easily amenable to words, it was necessary for such to be restrained from evil by force and fear 
in order that they might at least desist from evil-doing and leave others in peace, and that they themselves, 
by being habituated in this way, might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear and thus 
become virtuous. Now this kind of training which compels through fear of punishment is the discipline of 
laws.’ ST I-II q.95 a.1. 
21 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience p. 52. 
22 Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience p. 37. 
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Theological Arguments 
Williams relied on a distinction concerning the good to resist a position which 
advocated enforcement of unity on the good through persecution of dissidents. 
Aquinas relied on a similar distinction to accept the limitations of human law in 
cultivating virtue. Just as the former led to a vigorous defence of the freedom of 
religion based on respect for conscience, so one might expect the latter to have had a 
similar reception history in grounding an attitude of toleration. Unfortunately, this was 
not the case. As is well documented, the dominant position in the Catholic Church up 
to the Second Vatican Council was one closest to the model of theocracy, at least as 
the preferred form where achievable. 
 
In 1937 when the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Éamon de Valera drafted a 
new Constitution he included an Article recognizing the ‘special position of the 
Catholic Church’, as the Church of the majority of Ireland’s citizens. Interestingly, for 
a Constitution drafted in the nineteen thirties, the article also included recognition of 
the Jewish community and other religious groups. Hoping to get the Vatican’s 
approval, so as to increase its chances of adoption by the electorate, or at least disarm 
opponents, de Valera sent the draft Constitution to Rome. The reply of the Secretary 
of State (Pacelli, later Pope Pius XII) was that the Church could not give approval to a 
Constitution which was technically heretical, in that it did not acknowledge the 
Catholic Church as the one true Church of Christ. However, he undertook not to 
express any disapproval.23 
 
Even if Pacelli was not representing here a full blown version of theocracy, it 
was nonetheless a failure to respect the autonomy of the political. That is, it preferred 
to regard the political through the lens of theology, instead of allowing the political to 
determine for itself its appropriate relationship to the Church. It required of the 
Constitution to speak of the Church as the Church wishes to speak of herself, namely, 
as the one true Church of Christ, but could not grant the same courtesy to the State. 
Up until relatively recently, then, the official position of the Church has been a form 
of theocracy, and unwillingness in practice to approve compromise even in the face of 
political necessity. But with the developments in her self-understanding which 
                                                 
23 Gerard Hogan (ed.), The Origins of the Irish Constitution 1928-1941 (Dublin: Royal Irish Academy, 
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reached a peak in the Second Vatican Council, notably in the Pastoral Constitution on 
the Church in the Modern World, and The Declaration on Religious Liberty, the 
Church moved from the theocratic position to one of separation, but with partnership. 
The nature of that partnership is best expressed in the notion of dialogue. 
 
The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, Gaudium et 
spes, presents a complex understanding of the preferred relationship between the 
Church and the political community.24 In the section of the Constitution dealing with 
politics the complex is noted and analyzed. There is first of all the assertion of 
difference between Church and State. Second is the assertion of mutual independence 
and autonomy. But difference and mutual independence do not preclude cooperation. 
Accordingly, the possibility of cooperation is given by the fact that both political 
community (note, in this context, referring to more than the state: state plus civil 
society plus economy) and Church have similar functions though different. Both are 
‘helping the same men to fulfil their personal and social vocation’. This analysis, like 
the document as a whole, is rooted in an account of the human, both individual and 
social. Any possible distinction between this worldly and other worldly concerns is 
constrained by the fact that it is the same human reality which has both dimensions. 
Hence there is the potential for cooperation. ‘Man is not confined to the temporal 
order: living in human history he keeps his eternal vocation intact.’25 
 
From the Church’s point of view, the service of humankind is the domain in 
which State and Church can cooperate, because each in its own way is concerned with 
the facilitation of human fulfilment. This is made slightly less abstract in the passages 
concerning the common good, redefined as conditions for fulfilment. The Second 
Vatican Council following on from Pope John XXIII’s encyclical letter Mater et 
magistra in Gaudium et spes §26 declares ‘the common good’ to refer to the set of 
                                                 
24 ‘By virtue of her function and field of action the Church is quite distinct from the political 
community and uncommitted to any political system; she is at once the sign and the guarantee that 
human personality transcends the field of politics.  The political community and the Church in their 
respective fields are independent and autonomous; but under different titles they are both helping the 
same men to fulfil their personal and social vocation.  The more they co-operate reasonably, with an 
eye on the circumstances of time and place, the more effectively they will perform this service to 
everybody’s advantage. Man is not confined to the temporal order: living in human history he keeps his 
eternal vocation intact.’ Pastoral Constitution §76, translated by William Purdy (London: Catholic 
Truth Society, 1966). 
25 Pastoral Constitution, §76. 
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conditions which enables people, both as individuals and as groups, to achieve their 
fulfilment. This statement lists the conditions as economic, social, cultural, political. 
The following aspects of the declaration are central to the possibility of partnership of 
religion and politics. 
 
1. The Council recognises that there is a form of development and fulfilment 
which is appropriate to humankind. Human striving is oriented to that.  
2. This fulfilment is not simply a fulfilment of individuals. There is a fulfilment 
of community without which human development would be incomplete. 
3. The Council does not insist on what that complete human fulfilment would be 
at this point. The Council speaks of conditions that would have to be met for 
people to achieve their fulfilment. 
 
Note the complexity involved in this: the Church and the Council have a very 
definite idea of what human fulfilment consists in: ‘communion with God’. This 
echoes the teaching of Lumen gentium, the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, on 
the universal call to holiness. All humans are said to have the same end, as designated 
by their Creator, namely, God himself. However, the Council also expects that others 
such as atheists will not be able to accept this teaching, and certainly the modern 
liberal state will have to remain neutral concerning such an understanding of human 
fulfilment, and yet the Fathers of the Council expect that co-operation can be achieved 
in those elements which are conditions for human fulfilment, however it is 
understood. 
 
The Vatican Council dares to speak of the common good in a new way. As a 
result, there would appear to be a narrowing of the notion of common good from the 
ultimate end of human striving to the conditions which might facilitate the 
achievement of that fulfilment. In other words, the Council seems to be risking a 
reduction of the notion of the common good from a consideration of ultimate human 
goods, to a consideration of the means for achieving those goods. This reading of a 
reduction in the understanding of the common good would be mistaken, however. 
There is a nice complexity in the Council’s thought. It seems to be acknowledging 
that there is no agreement between believers and unbelievers for instance, or between 
Church and State, on the nature of human fulfilment. But it is also saying that all alike 
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can work together in creating and operating and maintaining the conditions for human 
fulfilment, even though we do not share the same vision of that fulfilment.  
 
The development in the Church’s presentation of its teaching reflected here 
has its parallel in the Council’s Declaration on Religious Liberty, Dignitatis humanae 
personae. The Declaration’s affirmation of the principle of religious freedom insists 
that no one is to be coerced against their conscience, even if they are in error. 
Commentators have noted the extent of the development signalled here, from a 
position where the Church was prepared to say that error had no rights, to a 
recognition that an erroneous conscience did not lose its dignity and continued to be 
entitled to respect.26 In these documents of the Vatican Council the Church declares 
that it will not be intending to rely on the coercive power available to the State in 
order to implement its views of the human good and of moral order. It is 
acknowledging that there are conditions for involvement in the political community, 
and it is agreeing to abide by those conditions. 
 
The Church is prepared to abide by those conditions which ensure the proper 
autonomy of the political, but she insists that she will not compromise her own proper 
autonomy. When that is threatened the Church will resist. The Pastoral Constitution 
stresses the distinctiveness of the Church’s mission, and warns of the danger that it 
could be compromised by adopting a mission in the merely economic, social or 
political order. This is consistent with the tradition of the Church’s self-understanding 
as a societas iuridice perfecta, i.e., that she is dependent on no other human 
organization for her identity, or for the means required to achieve her appropriate 
ends.27 This refers to versions of civil religion which regard the church simply as a 
contributor to social cohesion and public benefit through her pastoral, caritative and 
educational ministries. But perhaps the threats of civil religion are not so clearly 
recognizable when they are veiled in invitations to participate in public life as a 
member of civil society? A trend has emerged recently of identifying civil society as 
the appropriate forum for the Church’s contribution to political life. This does indeed 
provide the Church with new opportunities for collaboration. However, there is also a 
                                                 
26 See P. Riordan, ‘Permission to Speak: Religious Arguments in Public Reason’ in The Heythrop 
Journal, 45 (2004) 178-196. 
27 Pastoral Constitution §42. 
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danger that the Church is seen merely as an element of ‘organized civil society’ like 
other NGOs, (Non Governmental Organizations), and as NGOs have their particular 
interests, so too the distinctive concerns of the Church, for which she conducts 
publicity and advocacy work, are seen to be like theirs.  
 
The optimism of Gaudium et spes is striking, but the Pastoral Constitution is 
not naively optimistic – it is realistic about the negative aspects of human existence, 
as is clear from the discussions of war, poverty, injustice and abuse of human rights. 
The positive expectations about the possibilities of dialogue and cooperation do not 
imply that any actual instance of collaboration will be successful. In any actual 
political collaboration, as in politics in general, Christians motivated by Gaudium et 
spes can expect to encounter tensions. For instance, commitment to human rights 
might seem to be a promising forum, and a context for collaboration about the 
conditions for a decent human life. However, the Church’s understanding of human 
rights as expressed in Gaudium et spes is quite different from that of humanists, or 
even practising lawyers. This doesn’t simply apply to the foundational elements or 
what might be part of the discussion of ultimate common good, namely, human 
fulfilment. It also appears already in the instrumental dimension, for example in 
disagreements over abortion, a right to be assisted in killing oneself, legal recognition 
of same-sex partnerships and so on. While human rights discourse is predicated on 
human autonomy, which is rightly esteemed, the Council’s Pastoral Constitution 
warns about a false autonomy.28 Other participants in the dialogue will find this 
difficult, lacking any other criterion for evaluating human freedom than the 
foundational value of autonomy.29 Tensions also arise in many areas in which the 
Church cooperates with the political community in the provision of services, whether 
in education, health care or welfare provision. Experience shows that their faith ethos 
and vision colours everything that Christian institutions do. These services are 
constituted and shaped by beliefs about the source of human dignity, the range of 
knowledge to be explored and discovered (including theology, for instance) and the 
place of suffering and death in life. Precisely in these areas, when difficulties arise, 
                                                 
28 Pastoral Constitution §41. 
29 See for instance, James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), who 
argues for ‘normative agency’ as the ground of entitlement to human rights. Personhood, understood as 
normative agency, as the capacity of evaluating, choosing, and pursuing a conception of our good from 
a range of options, leads to the conclusion that the demented elderly and infants do not have human 
rights. He insists of course that we nonetheless have moral obligations towards them. 
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the Church must secure for herself the appropriate degree of autonomy and 
independence of political patronage, and resist being instrumentalized to the interests 
of the state.  
 
In the Church’s reflection on the possibility of cooperation, she must be 
careful not just to look at the difficulties posed by the opposing views of those who 
hold political power, for instance, but must be prepared to reflect on the Church as she 
may be seen by potential partners. Engagement with partners in the political domain 
must anticipate disagreement and conflict, and so will require a dimension of 
dialectic. But disagreement and conflict can also arise within the Church. 
Disagreement and conflict shape the context in which people might generate a 
measure of consensus about how they are to conduct their life together, through a 
careful process of dialogue and negotiation. This is the benefit of democratic systems, 
in which the Church wishes to participate, but the Church denies at the same time that 
a similar process is appropriate for its own clarification of its message: ‘While 
exchanges and conflicts of opinion may constitute normal expressions of public life in 
a representative democracy, moral teaching certainly cannot depend simply upon 
respect for a process: indeed, it is in no way established by following the rules and 
deliberative procedures typical of a democracy.’30 The point of this is clear: truth does 
not depend on agreement. However, the danger arises when the cautious reserve 
appropriate for safeguarding the Gospel message is applied also to matters of 
discipline or administration so that the absence of transparency and accountability 
appear to protect some vested interests. When the intra-ecclesial conversation does 
not model open dialogue, does the Church by its own style of proceeding undermine 
its own mission of dialogue with contemporary culture?  
 
In the Service of the Common Good 
The relationship between politics and religion can be conceived of in various 
ways. As noted above in the polarization of theocracy and civil religion, some views 
give priority to one or the other. Theocracy subordinates the political dimension to 
that of the religious. On the other hand, civil religion instrumentalizes religion for the 
sake of a political cause. Although they are polar opposites, common to both these 
                                                 
30 Pope John Paul II, Veritatis splendor (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1993) §113. 
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approaches is not only the tendency to privilege one side of the pair, but also to view 
the other pole through the lens of the privileged stance. The challenge is to find a way 
of dealing conceptually with the relationship between religion and politics, which 
respects the autonomy of each pole. At the same time, an adequate theoretical 
conceptualization must be such that it can be compatible with and hospitable to both a 
fully-fledged theological understanding of the nature of religion and an articulated 
philosophical account of the nature of politics. It must respect the distinctiveness of 
both dimensions, and avoid collapsing one into the other. At the same time it must be 
able to allow separation along with cooperation.31  
 
The notion of the common good provides one possibility of understanding the 
relationship between religion and politics which respects their distinctiveness. 
Because the notion is used analogically, it is possible to recognize the role of politics 
in relation to its specific common good while at the same time acknowledging that the 
unrestricted common good is the proper object of religion. The analogical use of the 
term means that its meaning shifts systematically from one context to another. This 
was illustrated above in the discussion about fulfilment as ultimate end, and the 
conditions for achieving human fulfilment. Both ultimate ends and conditions can be 
spoken of as common goods, but the latter as the concern of the political community 
does not have to presuppose some stance on what constitutes ultimate ends. 
 
The mistake of theocrats is to deny this. Some theocratic positions take 
Aristotle’s assertion that the good life pursued in the polis is the highest good which 
embraces all the rest, and fill in that summum bonum with content from their religious 
faith. They then conclude that the political authorities have responsibility to pursue 
that highest good so understood. Then the authorities are understood to be obligated to 
bring about harmony and unity in society in the shared acceptance of this good, and to 
legislate so as to make people good and equip them for salvation.  
 
In the face of the widespread assumption that the stance of the Catholic 
Church continues to be theocratic, it is very necessary to insist that not every 
                                                 
31 See P. Riordan, ‘Five Ways of Relating Religion and Politics; or Living in Two Worlds: Believer and 
Citizen’ in The New Visibility of Religion. Studies in Religion and Cultural Hermeneutics, edited by 
Graham Ward and Michael Hoelzl (London: Continuum Press, 2008), pp. 30-44.  
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religiously grounded position is theocratic. There are other theologically grounded 
positions which can support the exclusion of concern with the summum bonum, the 
highest good, from the agenda of the state. Early in the Christian tradition Augustine 
realised that the instruments available to civil authorities, typically coercive force, 
were inappropriate and inadequate to the task of making people good. In fact, he 
generalized his view that only God could make people good according to the divine 
standard of goodness, and hence that it could not be the responsibility of political 
authorities to lead people to their ultimate good.32 
 
This position receives a more nuanced reworking by Aquinas, who is reluctant 
to abandon so much of Aristotle. And so Aquinas can retain the insights of both his 
mentors, Aristotle and Augustine, by relying on distinctions such as that invoked 
above between the different senses of ‘good’. John Finnis has worked through some 
of this material and so I rely on his conclusions at this point.33 He draws on Aquinas 
to show that there is a perspective on the good relative to the state which does not 
exhaust the human good and leaves scope for other agents and authorities. In 
particular, since the interior attitude and intention (virtue) of agents is a major 
dimension of their goodness or holiness, and this is not accessible to the instruments 
of the human law-maker and enforcer, then the human authorities cannot have the 
unrestricted common good as their appropriate goal. Their object is the domain of 
means and conditions, facilitating the pursuit of the good by persons and groups. The 
delineation of religious liberty helps to mark this distinction, since it specifies limits 
to what the state may do in interfering, either positively or negatively, with the 
freedoms of people to follow their religious conscience.34 
 
Drawing on this account of goodness and of the limited capacities of the 
modern state I argue against theocrats that the instruments of the state are unsuitable 
for making people good and getting them to conform to the requirements of their 
                                                 
32 Augustine, The City of God, edited by D. Knowles, translated by H. Bettensen (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1972); R.A. Markus, Saeculum: History and Society in the Theology of St Augustine 
(Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 1970). 
33 John Finnis, ‘Public good: the specifically political common good in Aquinas’, in R. P. George (ed), 
Natural Law and Moral Inquiry: Ethics Metaphysics and Politics in the Work of Germain Grisez. 
(Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998) pp. 174-209. 
34 As discussed above, Martha Nussbaum’s book, Liberty of Conscience. In Defense of America’s 
Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2008) offers a very helpful reworking of the 
value of religious liberty as safeguarding the liberal polity. 
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religious world-view. Without wishing to consider the validity of the ends proposed, I 
concentrate on the inherent limitations of the modern state, which, both in Aristotelian 
terms and in terms of its own self-understanding, is not designed to deliver the kinds 
of effects which Aristotle and the theocrat hope for.  
 
Where the theocrat wishes to enrol the capacities of the state to serve 
religion’s ends, the proponent of civil religion wishes to recruit religious forms to 
serve political ends. In particular the forms of solidarity and social cohesion, along 
with the dimensions of moral commitment and motivation make the achievements of 
religion attractive for political purposes. Perhaps a radical secularism is much more of 
a challenge in the way politics is practiced today, whereby the tendency is to exclude 
religion completely from public life and confine it to the private sphere of individual 
choice. Nonetheless, civil religion remains as a possible stance which appears to take 
religion seriously but intrumentalizes it for political ends. The dangers for the 
proponents of civil religion are that they adopt some form of an immanentized 
ultimate end and make it the common good of politics. This is the danger seen in both 
extreme nationalism, and communism. But also the public culture of hedonistic 
consumerism can also become an operative goal of politics. In these cases, the 
political has transgressed on a domain in which it has no competence, namely, the 
ultimate goods of human life, and the liberal tradition at least warns that this should 
be the sphere of individual freedom. At the same time, the conditions of a social, 
economic and cultural nature are pressed into the service of an illusory fulfilment.  
 
Conclusion 
From Ronald Beiner’s commentary on Rousseau’s civil religion above we 
read his conclusion that ‘Good politics presupposes a false and inhuman religion; a 
true religion breeds bad politics.’ From our survey of the flaws of both theocracy and 
civil religion, and the exploration of a defensible liberalism providing for separation 
with collaboration, I hope to have shown that good religion and good politics can 
coexist. In conclusion then, mapping out the appropriate relationship between politics 
and religion, between a modern state and the Church, it is useful to formulate some 
negative and positive propositions to delineate the proper relations between them. 
Referring to the Aristotelian thesis that the good pursued by the polis is the highest 
good, I deny that the summum bonum or unrestricted common good is, or could ever 
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be, the common good of the modern liberal democratic state, or of combinations of 
states. It does not follow from this, of course, that the liberal democratic state has no 
appropriate common good of its own, and so I deny any such conclusion. I further 
deny that it is either exclusively or primarily the responsibility of the liberal 
democratic state, first to discover what makes for human flourishing, and second to 
implement its discoveries in policies designed to bring about human flourishing. 
 
On the positive side I propose that the common good of the liberal democratic 
state can be understood in terms of the means and conditions for human flourishing. 
Its processes can be understood as the search for and facilitation or provision of those 
conditions as elements of human flourishing are discovered and clarified. The 
development of the language of human rights can be understood in terms of this 
dynamic. Current debates, as concerning for instance the relative weights of equality 
and liberty, are examples of the search for the appropriate conditions to allow 
individuals and groups to pursue their own visions of the good life. I suggest that 
there are further debates, aesthetic, cultural, anthropological, philosophical, and 
theological, about what constitutes human flourishing, and that these need to be 
fostered and facilitated in the broader political culture of civil society, in institutions 
of education, academia, publishing and Churches. The modern state can carry on its 
business of providing conditions for human well-being, even if there is no consensus 
available to it about what constitutes human flourishing. Were it to attempt to fix 
policies according to one preferred answer to the questions about the highest good it 
would be exceeding its proper limits and violating liberties. 
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